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In the United States Court of Claims-January1856.
STURGES, BENNETT & CO. vs. THE UNITED STATES.
1. Where certain liquors were imported into the United States in casks, which upcn
being gauged were found to be reduced in quantity by leakage, it was held that
no duties could be imposed except upon the quantity which actually arrived in
the country, and which is to be ascertained by the gauger's return.
2. Mode of recovering excess of duties, or estimated duties under Acts of March 8,
1839; February 26, 1845, and August 8, 1846, considered and commented on.

Messrs. (MlarlesAbert and John 0. Sargent, for claimants.
iYl. Blair, solicitor for United States.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCARBURQH, J.-In this case the petitioners allege, that during
the years 1847, 1848, 1849, and 1860, they imported into the
United States certain quantities of brandy and other liquors in
casks, and paid duties thereon at the rate of one hundredper centum,
not only on the value of the quantity of liquor ascertained by gauge
to be contained in the casks, but also on the value of the quantity
of liquor which had leaked out of the casks on the voyage of importation; and that they claim a return of the moneys extracted
from them as import duties on such leakage, or non-imported liquors.
The petitioners refer in their petition to a statement prepared by
the collector of New York, by order of the Secretary of the Treasury,
for a particular account of their claim. From this statement, it
appears that, under instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury,
the duties upon their importations were levied according to their
invoice value, without reference to deficiencies, unless arising from
accident at sea. It was conceded in the argument submitted in
this case, that the leakage arose not from any accident at sea, but
from other causes, and that the deficiency was ascertained from the
return of the gaugers.
The act of Congress entitled "An act reducing the duty on imports, and for other purposes," approved July 30th, 1846, imposed
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a duty of one hundred per centum ad valorem on brandy and other
spirits, distilled from grain or other materials imported from foreign
countries. According to the principles settled by the cases of
Marriott vs. Brune, 9 How. 619; The United States vs. Southmayd, Ibid. 637; and Lawrence vs. Caswell, 12 How. 488this duty is imposed, not upon the quantity of brandy which may
have been purchased abroad, but upon the quantity which actually
arrives in the country.
In the case of Marriott vs. Brune, duties had been imposed upon
importations of sugar and molasses made after the act of 1846, according to invoice quantity; but the report of the weighers and
gaugers showed a deficiency between that quantity and the quantity
actually imported. Mr. Justice Woodbury, who delivered the
opinion of the court, said: "The general principle applicable to
such a case would seem to be, that revenue should be collected only
from the quantity or weight which arrives here. That is, what is
imported; for nothing is imported until it comes within the limits
of a port. (See cases'cited in R7arrison vs. Vose, 9 Howard, 372.)
And by express provision in all our revenue laws, duties are imposed only on imports from foreign countries, or the importation
from them, or what is imported. (5 Stat. at Large, 548, 558.)
The very act under consideration imposes the duty on what is imported from foreign countries. (p. 68.) The Constitution uses like
language on the subject. (Article 1, sects. 8 and 9.) Indeed, the
general definition of customs confirms this view; for, says McCulloch,
(Vol. I. p. 548) "Customs are duties charged upon commodities
on their being imported into or exported from a country."
"As to imports, they therefore can cover nothing which is not
actually brought into our limits. That is the whole amount which
is entered at the custom-house; that is all which goes into the consumption of the country ;-that, and that alone, is what comes in
competition with our domestic manufactures; and we are unable to
see any principle of public policy which requires the words of the
act of Congress to be extended so as to embrace more.
"When the duty was specific on this article, being a certain rate
per pound before the act of 1846, it could of course extend to no

STURGES ET AL. vs. THE UNITED STATES.

larger number of pounds than was actually entered. The change
in the law has been merely in the rate and form of the duty, and
not in the quantity on which it should be assessed.
" On looking a little further into the principles of the case, it will
be seen that a deduction must be made from the quantity shipped
abroad whenever it does not all reach the United States, or we shall
in truth assess here what does not exist here. The collection of
revenue on an article not existing, and never coming into the country,
would be an anomaly-a mere fiction of law-and is not to be countenanced when not expressed in acts of Congress, nor required to
enforce just rights."
The same doctrine is directly applied to importations of brandy,
in the case of Lawrence vs. Caswell.
It is moreover held, in these cases, that the quantity actually
imported is to be ascertained by the gauger's return. In the case
of Lawrence vs. Caswell,. the question whether the duty ought to
be computed on the quantity stated in the invoices, or on the contents
as ascertained by the gauger's return, was, in terms, considered by
the court, and the decision was, that the duty ought to be computed
on the latter, and that this question was substantially the same with
that decided in the case of .Zfarriott vs. Brune. It may be true,
as suggested by the Solicitor, that there is no mode in which the
quantity imported can be ascertained with absolute certainty; but
there can be no doubt, we think, that the decision of the Supreme
Court, recognizing the measurement by gauge. as the proper legal
method for that purpose, is in conformity both to the acts of Congress and to the usage of the government of the United States for
more than half a century.
It is apparent, therefore, that the duties, now sought to be reclaimed, were paid upon brandies not actually imported, and, consequently, that they were not imposed by law. If, therefore, the
petitioners be not entitled to relief, it is not because they have not
paid the United States money which the acts of Congress did not
require them to pay, but because they paid it under such circumstances as took from them the right to require its re-payment.
Prior to the act of March 3d, A. D. 1839, an importer might
22
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maintain an action for the recovery of the excess of duties, or for
the recovery of duties illegally exacted against a collector, in two
classes of cases : 1st, where the payment was made for unascertained
or estimated duties; and, 2d, where it was made under protest.
These two classes are distinctly recognized by Daniell, J., in the
opinion delivered by him for the majority of the court, in the case
"It -will be
of Carey vs. Cnrtis, 3 Howard, 243. He said:
have
collectors
which
in
cases,
principal
two
the
that
remembered
claimed the right to retain, have been those of unascertained duties,
and of suits brought, or threatened to be brought, for the recovery
of duties paid under protest. It is matter of history that the alleged
right to retain on these two accounts had led to great abuses and to
much loss to the public; and it is to these two subjects, therefore,
that the act of Congress particularly addresses itself." Again:
"Besides the litigation spoken of, and which issaid to lead to this
result, is a litigation for duties paid under protest, and not for overpayment of unascertained duties." (9 How. 242.) Again: "Independently of this statute, the collector might have sued for overpayments on unascertained duties, as well as for duties paid under
protest. And it can hardly be reconciled with reason or consistency,
that Congress designed to preserve the right of suit in the one case
and deny it in the other. Yet, if these words would have the force
contended for by the defendant in error, they give the right of action
against th&collector for duties. paid under protest only, leaving the
party who has overpaid unasceAained and estimated duties no
remedy but that of resorting to the Secretary of the Treasury."
Ibid. 244.
The effect of the act of March 3d, 1839, was to take away the
right of action against collectors in both these classes of cases.
(Carey vs. Curtis, 3 Howard, 236.) But by way of compensation to the importer for the loss of his remedy by action, this act
made it the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, where it should
be shown to his satisfaction that in any case of unascertained duties,
or duties paid under protest, more money had been paid to the
collector or person acting as such than the law required should have
been paid, to take the prescribed measures to have it refunded to
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the person entitled to the over-payment. It may be proper to
remark at this point, (1) that this act did not in any way affect or
propose to affect the right of a party making an over-payment in
any case therein mentioned to re-payment; and (2) that the power
which it confers upon the Secretary of the Treasury is purely administrative, and in no sense judicial. If, therefore, under this
act, an importer, in a case either of unascertained duties or of duties
paid under protest, paid to a collector more money than he was by
law required to pay, but could not show to the satisfaction of the
Secretary of the Treasury that he had done so, he was without any
enforceable remedy; but, nevertheless, the action of the Secretary
of the Treasury not being judicial,but merely administrative, the
implied contract of the United States to refund to the importer what
had been taken or detained from him without authority of law still
remained unsatisfied and undischarged.
Soon after the decision in the case of Carey vs. Curtis was made,
the act of February twenty-sixth, A. D. eighteen hundred and fortyfive, was passed. What changes in the law were effected by it?
1. It restored sub modo the right of action against a collector in
cases of duties paid under protest. And, 2. It required the protesi
to be made in writing and signed by the claimant at or before the
payment of the duties, setting forth distinctly and specifically the
grounds of objection to the payment thereof. It is as follows:
"That nothing contained in the second section of the act entitled
An act making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses
of the government, for the year one thousand eight hundred and
thirty-nine,' approved on the third day of March, one thousand
eight hundred and thirty-nine, shall take away or be construed to
take away or impair the right of any person or persons who have
paid or shall hereafter pay money as and for duties under protest
to any collector of the customs or other person acting as such, in
order to obtain goods, wares, or merchandise imported by him or
them, or on his or their account, which duties are not authorized or
payable in part or in whole by law, to maintain any action at law
against such collector or other person acting as such, to ascertain
and try the legality and validity of such demand and payment of
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duties, and to have a right to a trial by jury touching the same.
according to the due course of law. Nor shall anything contained
in the second section of the act aforesaid be construed to authorize
tile Secretary of the Treasury to refund any duties paid under
protest; nor shall any action be maintained against any collector
to recover the amount of duties so paid under protest, unless the
said protest was made in writing and signed by the claimant at or
before the payment of said duties, setting forth distinctly and specifically, the grounds of objection to the payment thereof." (5 Stat.
at Large, 727.)
But this act is silent upon the subject of unascertained duties.
It mentions only duties paid under protest. It is wholly inapplicable, therefore, to unascertained duties, and the rights of an
importer in reference to the latter remained the same after as they
were before the passage of that act.
The only remaining act of Congress at all connected with the
subject, is the act of August 8, A. D. 1846. The second section of
that act is as follows: "That the Secretary of the Treasury be,
and he is hereby authorized, out of any money in the treasury not
otherwise appropriated, to refund to the several persons entitled
thereto such sums of money as have been illegally exacted by
collectors of the customs under the sanction of the Treasury
Department, for duties on imported merchandise since the third of
March, eighteen hundred and thirty-three: -Provided,that before
any such refunding, the Secretary shall be satisfied, by decisions of
the courts of the United States upon the principle involved, that
such duties were illegally exacted. And provided also, that such
decisions of the courts shall have been adopted or acquiesced in by
the Treasury Department as its rule of construction.'.' (9 Stat. at
Large, 84.)
That statute has no application to unascertained duties. It in
terms applies only to duties illegally exacted. Now, unascertained
duties, in the strictest sense of those terms, certainly as applicable
to a case like the one now under consideration, are not illegally
exacted. There can be no illegality as respects them, except in
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the detention of the over-payment after the true amount of duties
has been legally ascertained.
When an entry is made, the collector, jointly with the naval
officer, or alone where there is none, is required by law to make a
gross estimate of the amount of duties on the goods entered, and if
the goods be entered for home consumption, and not warehoused, no
permit will be granted for landing them, until such estimated duties
are paid. (1 Stat. at L., p. 664, §49; 1 Ibid., p. 673, § 62; 9
Ibid., p. 53, § 1.) And if it be necessary, in order to ascertain the
duties thereon, to weigh, gauge, or measure the goods, they cannot,
without the consent of the proper officer, be removed from the place
where they are landed, before they have been weighed, gauged or
measured; and if spirits, before the proof or quality and quantity
thereof are ascertained and marked thereon, by or under the direction of the proper officer for that purpose. (1 Stat. at L., p. 665,
§ 51.) So far, therefore, from unascertained duties being duties
illegally exacted, they are always demanded and paid in strict conformity to law. The very terms imply that duties are, to some
extent, imposed and payable in the particular case, but that the
true amount is unknown and unascertained at the time of payment.
The law, in its requirements upon this subject, looks both to the
security of the United States, and to the interests of the importer;
the just demands of the United States are secured by the payment
of the estimated duties, and the goods are liberated without any
unnecessary delay, so that they may at once go into the possession
of the importer, and enter into his business. But the object, as
regards the United States, is to secure their just demands, and
nothing more; and the payment is made under an implied contract
on the part of the United States, that the excess, if any, beyond
the amount of duties actually imposed by law, shall be refunded to
the importer. There can be no doubt, then, that in the legal sense,
unascertained duties are never illegally exacted, and, consequently,
that the second section of the act of Aug. 8, 1846, does not apply
to them.
According to these principles, the case under consideration is, in
its nature, a case of unascertained duties ; but it is insisted on the
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part of the United States, that at the time when the importations
which it embraces were made, the duties thereon, under a regulation
of the Treasury Department, were required to be computed on the
invoice quantity, and that the duties in question were therefore
ascertained at the time of their payment. Without pausing to
inquire whether the consequences deduced from this regulation
would necessarily have followed, it is sufficient to remark, that the
regulation itself was in conflict with law, and invalid. .Marriottvs.
Brune ; The United States vs. Southmayd; Lawrence vs. Caswell.
"The Secretary of the Treasury is hound by the law, and
although in the exercise of his discretion, he may adopt necessary
forms and modes of giving effect to the law, yet neither he nor
those who act under him, can dispense with or alter any of its provisions. It would be a most dangerous principle to establish, that
the acts of a ministerial officer, when done in good faith, however
injurious to private rights and unsupported by law, should afford no
ground for legal.Y'edress." Per Mr. Justice M'Lean, in Tracy vs.
Szwartwout, 10 Peters, 95.
"Any instructions from the Treasury Department could not
change the law." Per Mr. Justice Thompson, in Elliott vs. S iwart-

wout, 10 Peters, 135.
"The various circulars from the Treasury Department, which
have been referred to, and which have been construed in some
cases to permit the deduction of the quantity not really arriving in
this country, and in Others to forbid it, are entitled to much respect
in deciding on the true meaning of the revenue laws; but when
contradictory or obscure, they furnish less aid, and are never
decisive or incontrollable." Per Mr. Justice Woodbury, in Marriott
vs. Brune, 9 Howard, 634-5.
"The orders as well as the opinions of the head of the Treasury
Department, expressed in either letters or circulars, are entitled to
much respect, and will always be duly weighed by this court; but it
is the laws which are to govern, rather than their opinions of them ;
and importers, in cases of doubt, are entitled to have their rights
settled by the judicial exposition of these laws, rather than by the
views of the department. 3ifarriottvs. Brune, 9 Howard, 634, 635.
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And though, as between the custom-house officers and the department, the latter must by law control the course of proceeding (5
Stat. at Large, 566), yet, as between them and the importers, it is
well settled that the legality of all their doings may be revised in
the judicial tribunals. Tracy et al. vs. Swartwout, 10 Peters, 95 ;
United States vs. Lyman, 1 Mason 0. 0. 534; Opinions of Attorneys General, 1015." Per Mr. Justice Woodbury, in Greely vs.
Thompson, 10 Howard, 254.
The regulation of the Treasury Department referred to by the
Solicitor, cannot therefore have the influence or effect claimed for
it in his argument. The duties in question here are, in their nature,
under the acts of Congress, nuascertained at the time of their payment, and no regulation of the Treasury Department could deprive
the petitioners of the right vested in them by law so to consider
and treat them. The obvious reason is, that no such regulation can
change the supreme law of the land.
This then being a case of unascertained duties, it was competent
for the Secretary of the Treasury, under the act of March 3, 1839,
which, for this purpose, is still in force, if it had been shown to his
satisfaction that more money had been paid to the collector than,
the law required should have been paid, to have taken the measures
presented by.that act to have it refunded to the petitioners. But
this, the petitioners allege, he has refused to do upon the grounds
that no protest was made, and that a portion of the claim was barred
by the statute of limitations. The petitioners, therefore, are entitled
to relief unless the action of the Secretary of the Treasury is conclusive against them. We have already stated, that the power of
the Secretary of the Treasury under that act is purely administrative,
and in no sense judicial. This is sufficiently obvious from the very
terms of the act. It did not vest the Secretary of the Treasury
with the power of deciding upon the rights of the claimant, except
to the extent that he might be required to act upon them. It made
it a condition precedent to the party's right to the Secretary's
warrant upon the Treasurer for the over-payment, that he should
satisfy the former that his claim belonged to one of the classes
mentioned in the act, and was well founded. This mode of redress
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was thus conditioned and restrained, and for wise and good reasons.
It would not have been either proper or politic to have authorized
a payment out of the public treasury, to a party whose rights had
not been regularly adjudicated and legally ascertained, except upon
the very condition imposed by the statute, that he should show to
the satisfaction of the head of the Treasury Department that his
case was one for which the statute meant to provide. It was not
designed that he should obtain relief from a ministerial officer, unless
his case was shown to be one on which such officer could act with
entire safety to the public interests. If he failed to show such a
ease, then he failed to obtain the benefit of the statutory remedy;
but it was not designed that his rights should be otherwise affected.
The implied contract of the United States, in a case of unascertained
duties to refund the over-payment, would still continue in full vigor
-the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury affecting merely his
own official action, and nothing more. And it is no answer to this
view, that in such a case the party was without remedy, except by
an appeal to the legislative department of the government; for if
that were sufficient, then there would be but few cases of contract
of which this court could take cognizance.

-In the Supreme Court of Indiana.
Before PmtuINS, 3.
HERMAN vs. THE STATE.

1. A law which absolutely forbids the people of the State to manufacture and sell
ivhiskey, ale, porter and beer, for use as a beverage, or at all, except for the government, to be sold by it as medicine, and absolutely prohibits the use of these
articles as a beverage, is unconstitutional. Per PERxnIS, J.
2. It is an invasion by the government upon the faculties of industry possessed by
individuals, when it attempts to appropriate to itself any particular branches of
industry, or any business which is not of a public general character.
3. There are certain absolute rights, and the rightkof property is among them, which
in all free governments must of necessity be protected from legislative interference, irrespective of constitutional checks and guards.
4. The power of the legislature to declare nuisances.
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J.-Herman was arrested upon a charge of having violated the liquor act of 1855. He obtained a writ of habeas corpus,
pursuant to which he is now brought before us at chambers with the
cause of his detention in custody.
His counsel moves for his discharge on the ground that said liquor
act is unconstitutional and void. The case is submitted to us upon
the arguments heretofore filed in the Supreme Court in the case of
Bebee.
We regret that this question has been thus presented to us. We
had hoped that.these applications would have been confined to the
inferior courts till the Supreme Court had decided upon the validity
of the law in question.
But the legislature, acting, as we think, within the constitution,
has conferred upon the citizen the right of suing out the writ of
habeas corpus from the judges severally of the Supreme Court; the
right has been exercised in this case, and it is not for us, upon slight
pretexts, to shrink from the discharge of the duty, thus, as we cannot indeed but believe, injudiciously imposed upon us.
Counsel on both sides Concede in argument that the record presents the question of the validity of, at least, what is alleged to be
the prohibitory portion of said liquor act, and that question will,
therefore, without inquiry upon the point, be considered.
We approach it with all the caution and solicitude its nature is
calculated to inspire, and that intention of careful investigation its
importauce demands, feeling that the consequences of the principles
we are about to assert will not be confined in their operation to this
case alone. Preliminary to the discussion of the main questions involved, however, the course of argument of counsel requires that we
should say a word by way of fairly setting forth the duty this court
has to perform in the premises, viz; the simply declaring the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the law, with an assignment of
the reasons upon which the declaration is based.
It will not be for us to inquire whether it be a good or bad law,
in the abstract, unless the fact as it might turn out to be, should
become of some consequence in determining a doubtful point on the
PERKIIS,
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main question. It not unfrequently becomes the duty of courts to
enforce injudicious acts of the legislature because they are constitutional, and to strike down such as at first view, appear to be judicious, because they are in conflict with the constitution.
With these remarks, we*proceed to the examination of the feature
of the liquor act of 1855 now more especially presented to the court.
We shall not spend time upon the inquiry, whether, on the day it
came into force there were existing unsold manufactured products
in the hands of the distillers and brewers upon which it operated,
rendering them valueless, or whether such products had all been
disposed of between the passage and taking effect of the law. We
shall direct our investigation to the character of its operation upon
the future-manufacture, sale and consumption of intoxicating liquors.
And,
1st. Is it prohibitory?
The first section enacts ", that no person shall manufacture, keep
for sale, or sell" any "1ale, porter, malt beer, lager beer, cider,
wine," &c. The second section permits the manufactdre and sale
of cider and wine under certain restrictions, by any and all of the
citizens of the State.
Other sections permit the manufacture of whiskey, ale, &c., by
persons licensed for the purpose, so far as may be necessary to suppl whatever demand certain persons called county agents may make
upon them. These agents are authorized to sell for medicinal, mechanical and sacramental uses, and no other, and may procure their
liquors of the licensed manufacturers, but are not required to do so,
and, as a matter of fact do not, but obtain them in most cases from
abroad. They constitute no part of the people engaged in business
on their own account, but are appointed under the law by the county
commissioners; supplied with funds from the county treasury; paid
a compensation for their services by the county ; sell at prices fixed
for them, and make the profits and losses of the business for the
public treasury and not for themselves. We say they are furnished
with public funds. They are so in all cases; for when they, in the
first instance, invest their own, it is by way of loan to the county at
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a fixed rate of interest, and the amount 'is refunded by the county
with interest. These selling agents, then, are, and for convenience
may be denominated government agents; for it is all one in principle whether the government 6reates and furnishes them with funds
through tie medium of the counties, or appoints them directly by
statute, and supplies them with funds from the State treasury. To
express, then, the substance of the main provisions of the law, they
may be paraphrased thus :
Be it enacted; 1st. That the trade and business of manufacturing
-whiskey, ale, porter, and beer, now and heretofore carried on in this
State, shall cease; except that any person specially licensed to manufacture for medicine, &c., for the government, may do so, and sell
to that extent, if the government should conclude to buy of such
person, but not otherwise.
2. That no person in this State shall sell any whiskey, beer,
ale or porter, unless the sale be to an agent of the government
or by such agent for medicine, &a.
3. That no person in this State shall drink any whiskey, beer,
ale or porter, as a beverage, and in no instance except as a medicine.
It thus appears that the law absolutely forbids the people of
the State to manufacture and sell whiskey, ale, porter, and beer
for use as a beverage; or, at all, except for the government, to
be sold by it for medicine, &c.; and it prohibits absolutely the use
of those articles by the people as a beverage.
The exception as to the admission of foreign liquors under the
constitution and laws of the United States, will not be noticed,
for the reason that they are admitted simply becafse they cannot
be prohibited, and not in accordance with the spirit and policy
of the State statute; and which foreign liquors inay or may not
be obtained here according to the contingent action of other powers;
and for the further reason, that their admission, if claimed to be
a part of the object and policy of the State liquor law, in order
tb supply the people with liquor as a beverage, renders the law
doubly objectionable; for, while, according to such a view, the law

HERMAN vs. THE STATE.

designs to permit the use of liquors as a beverage, it prohibits
the people from manufacturing for, their own use. It is as if the
law were'that the people might eat bread but should not raise the
grain and grind it into flour wherewith to make it. It would be
an act to prohibit the people from themselves producing; and to
compel them to purchase from abroad what they might need to
eat and drink. It would involve the principle of an act to annihilate the State by starving the people constituting it to death;
and such legislation would hardly comport, we think, with a constitution established to promote the welfare and prosperity of the
people.
We assume it as established, then, that the liquor act in question is absolutely prohibitory of the manufacture, sale and use as
a beverage, by the people of this State, of whiskey, ale, porter,
and beer. The opinion has been advanced that the manufacture
for sale out of the State is not prohibited, but it has not the
substance of a shadow; and the morality of that law which prohibits the distribution of pauperism and crime, disease and death
at home, but permits them to be scattered amongst our neighbors,
is not to be envied. And we may as well remark here as anywhere, that if the manufacture and sale of these articles are proper to be carried on in the State for any purpose, it is not competent for the governmant to take the business from the people
and monopolize it. The government cannot turn druggist and
-become the sole dealer in medicines in the State. And why ?
Because the business was, at and before the organization of the
government, and is properly at all times a private pursuit of the
people, as much so as the manufacture and sale of brooms, tobacco,
cloths, and the dealing in tea, coffee and rice, and the raising of
potatoes; and the government was organized to protect the people
in such pursuits from the depredation of powerful and lawless individuals, the barons of the middle ages, whom they were too weak to
resist single-handed by force ; and for the government now to seize
upon those pursuits is subversive of the very object for which it was
created. "A government is guilty of an invasion upon the faculties
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of industry possessed by individuals when it appropriates to itself a
particular branch of industry, the business of exchange and brokerage for example; or when it sells the exclusive privilege of conducting it." Say's Political Economy, note to p. 134.
There are undertakings of a public character, such-as the making
of public highways, providing a uniform currency, &c., that a single individual has not power to accomplish, and .which government
must, therefore, prosecute; but they are not the ordinary pursuits
of: the private citizen.
These, certainly as the general rule, and we are not now prepared to name an exception, the government cannot engage in.
This is all we- shall here- say upon this point. Time and space
forbid that we should elaborate all that arise in the case.
The question now.presents- itselfSecondly. Could the legislature of this State enact the prohibitory liquor la'wunder consideration?
Few, if any, judicial decisions.will be foundto aid us, in investigating this question, as no such law, in a country possessed of a
judiciary and a constitution limiting the legislative power, has, till
of late, been enacted. Some twelve hundred years ago 'Mahomet
made such a law a part of his religious creed, in opposition to the
Jewish and Christian ' systems, wbich recommended the moderate,
but forbid tht excessive use of' intoxicating liquors. This law of
M ahomet, Koran, pages 25 and 93, was perhaps the first probihitory act, but, it does not appear to have been adopted by civilized
nations till its late revival, in some shape or other, in one or more
of our sister States. Hence, it has'not often, if at all as to this
point, passed under judicial consideration.
A number of European -writers on natural,.public and civil law,
are cited by counsel on behalf of 'the State, to show the extent of
legislative power; but those writers, respectable, able and instructive upon some subjects, as they are admitted to be, are not authority here upon .this point. They are dangerous, indeed, utterly
blind guides to follow, in searching for the land-marks of legislative
power in our free and limited government; for they had in view,
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when writing, governments as existing when and where they wrote,
under which they lived and had been educated, and which had no
written constitutions limiting their powers-governments, the theory
of which was that they were paternal in character-that all power
was in them by divine right, and they, hence, absolute; that the
people of a country had no rights except what the government of
that country graciously saw fit to confer upon them, and that
it was its duty, as a father towards his children, to command
whatever it deemed expedient for the public good, without first in
any manner consulting that public, or recognizing in its members
any individual rights.
Indeed, the discovery of the great doctrine of rights in the
,people, as against the government, had not been made when the
writers above referred to lived. Such governments as those described, could adopt the maxim quoted by counsel, that the safety
of the people is the supreme law, and act upon it; and being severally the sole judges of what their safety, in the countries governed,
respectively required, could prescribe what the people should eat
and drink, what political, moral and religious creeds they should
believe in, and punish heresy by burning at the stake, all for the
public good. Even in Great Britain, esteemed to have the most
liberal constitution on the Eastern continent, Magna Chartais not
of sufficient potency to restrain the action of Parliament, as the
judiciary do not, as a settled rule, bring laws to the test of its provisions. Laws are there overthrown only occasionally by judicial
construction. But here we have written constitutions which are
the supreme law, which our legislators are sworn to support, within
whose restrictions they must limit their action for the public welfare, and whose barriers they cannot overleap, under any pretext
of supposed safety of the people ; for along with our written constitutions we have a judiciary whose duty it is, as the only means
of securing to the people safety from.legislative aggression, to annul
all legislative action without the pale of those instruments. This
duty of the judicial department, in this country, was demonstrated
by Chief Justice Marshall in Jffarberry vs. Madison, 1 Cranch, 187,

HERMAN vs. THE STATE.

and has since been recognized as settled American law. The maxim
above quoted, therefore, as applied to legislative power, is here
without meaning.
N~or does it prove the power of the State legislature to enact the
law in question, to show that the Supreme Court of the United
States has decided that it cannot declare such a State law inoperative, for that court can only declare void such State laws as conflict
with the restrictions imposed upon State power by the Constitution
of the United States; and. if, in that constitution, the States are
not restrained from passing laws in violation of the natural rights
of the citizen, the Supreme Court of the United States cannot act
upon such laws when passed, because they do not fall within its
jurisdiction. Hence, that court has decided that a State may
deprive its citizens of property without making compensation, and
of the right of trial by jury; Brown vs. Te Mayor, &c., 7 Peters,
243; may pass laws depriving them of vested rights in property,
and of the benefit of judgments they may have obtained in courts,
and the like; Satterlee vs. atthewson, 2 Peters, 880, and the
license cases in 5 Howard, 504; and no redress be obtainable in
the United States courts, because there are no provisions in the
United States Constitution prohibiting the passage of such State
laws. But the Supreme Court of this State has decided that, under
our State Constitution, the legislature cannot enact a law for the
taking of private property without making compensation; cannot
deprive the citizen of the right of trial by jury, and cannot set
aside the judgment of a court, &c. Young vs. The State Bank,
4 Ind. Rep. 801; MXcorrmick vs. Lafayette, 1 Ind. 48; The State
vs. Mead, 4 Blackf. 309.
It does not therefore follow, that because the Constitution of the
United States does not- prohibit State legislation infringing the
natural rights of the citizen, such legislation is valid. The Constitution of the United States may not, but that. of the State may,
inhibit it.
And so, indeed, according to many eminent judges, may principles of natural justice, independently of all constitutional restraint.
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This doctrine has been asserted here. In Andrews vs. Russell, 7
Blackf. 474, Judge Dewey says: "We have said that the only
provisions in the federal or State constitutions restrictive of the
power of the legislature, &c. are, &c. There are certain absolute
rights, and the right of property is among them, which in all free
governments must of necessity be protected from legislative interference, irrespective of constitutional cheeks and guards."
Should we find, however, in the course of this investigation, that
the constitution of our free State does, in fact, sufficiently protect
natural rights from legislative interference, as it surely does, or it
is grievously defective, it will not become necessary for us to inquire
iwhether, in any event, it might be proper to fall back upon the
dodtrine above so unhesitatingly asserted.
Does our constitution, then, prohibit the passage of such an act
as that now being considered? A dictum is quoted by counsel from
the opinion in Beply vs. The State, 4 Ind. Rep. 264, that "it is
competent for the legislature to declare any practice deemed injurious to the public a nuisance, and to punish it accordingly;"
and hence, it is reasoned, any property; but dicta, as counsel well
know, are not necessarily law; are, in fact, generally unconsidered
first impressions, which, all legal experience proves, are thrown out
by all judges in giving opinions, as habitually and thoughtlessly as
violations of the constitution are perpetrated by the legislature in
enacting laws, and infinitely more excusably. Scarcely an elaborate opinion is written not containing them. This the profession
well understand, and hence are not misled by them, if erroneous.
And it must be manifest to every one, on a moment's consideration, that the doctrine just quoted cannot be taken for law, and
could not have been so intended, in an unlimited sense, by the
learned judge who uttered it. The legislature cannot declare any
practice it may deem injurious to the public a nuisance, and punish
it accordingly. It cannot so declare the practice of reading the
Bible, though perhaps the government of Spain once did. It cannot so declare the practice of worshipping God according to the
dictates of one's own conscience, though perhaps Massachusetts, in
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the days of Roger Williams, did do it. It cannot so declare the
practice of teaching schools, though perhaps Virginia might have
done so in 1674, when Governor Berkley wrote from that colony:
"I thank God there are no free schools nor printing; and I hope
we shall not have these hundred years: for learning has brought
disobedience and heresy and sects into the world, and printing has
divulged them, and libels against the best government. God keep
us from both." It cannot so declare the holding of political meetings and making speeches, the bearing of arms, publishing of newspapers, &c., &c., however injurious to the public the legislature
might deem such practices to be; and why? Because the constitution forbids such declaration and punishment, and permits the
people to use these practices. So with property; the legislature
cannot interfere with it further, at all events, than the constitution
permits. In short, the legislature cannot forbid and punish the
doing of that which the constitution says they shall have and enjoy.
If it can, then we think all will admit that the constitution itself
is worthless, the liberties of the people a dream, and our govern-ient as despotic as any on earth.
And we may here remark, that the legislature can add nothing
to its power over things, by declaring them nuisances. A public
nuisance is that which is noxious, offensive to all the people who
may come in contact with it; and the offensive quality is in the
thing itself, or the particular manner of its use, and is neither increased nor diminished by a legislative declaration. What the legislature has a right by the constitution to prohibit and punish, even
to the forfeiture of property, it may thus deal with without first
declaring the matter a nuisance; and whatever it has not a right
by'the constitution to prohibit and punish, it cannot thus deal with,
even though it first fix upon it that odious name. To illustrate the legislature has power, perhaps unlimited, over the public highways. It provides for opening, repairing, and vacating them. They
are not the private property of the citizen. The legislature, therefore, may declare what obstructions shall be permitted, and what
removed, whether they be, in fact, nuisances or not. So with Congress, in relation to the national highways for commerce. These
23
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are public for purposes of navigation, and are perhaps completely
-under the legislative power. So the legislature, when the practice
was to license houses for the exclusive retail of spirituous liquors,
that is, the sale of them in particular quantities at particular
places, could impose conditions upon which the license should be
granted, and could make the violation of the conditions cause of
forfeiture, whether it was such as rendered the retailing house a
nuisance or not, and whether it was so denominated or not.
But the legislature cannot declare the path from my house to
my barn, nor any obstruction I may place in it, a nuisance, .and
,order it discontinued; nor can it, declare my store room and stock
of goods a nuisance, prohibit my selling them, and order them
,destroyed, because such acts would invade private property which
;the constitution protects. Still the fact may be that the path and
the store room are nuisances which I have no right to maintain;
.for while I have the right to use my own property, still I must not
,so use it as to injure others. So all trades, practices and property,
-may, by the manner, time, or place of use, become nuisances in
fact, in quality and subject, consequently, to forfeiture and abate-ment: for example, slaughter-houses in cities, or some descriptions
of retailing houses; and this the legislature may have inquired
,into, and, if the fact of nuisance be found, may have the forfeiture
.and abatement adjudged and executed. And it is the province of
-the judiciary to conduct the inquiry, or deny it, as the truth may
--tarn out to be. Many things, by such proceedings, have already
-become established nuisances at common law. By this mode, when
a party loses his trade or property, he does so because of his own
fault, and this according to the judgment of his peers, and the provision of the general law of the land, and not by the tyranny of
the legislature, whose enactment may not be the law of the land.
See numerous cases collected on this point, in the first chapter of
Blackwell on Tax Titles.
In accordance with this doctrine, we find that the criminal code
-of this State has ever contained the general provision that any
person who erected or maintained a nuisance should be fined, &d.,
and that the nuisance might be abated; 2 IR. S. pp. 428, 429, secs.
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8 and 9-a provision that submits it to the country, to wit, a jury,
under the charge of the court, to decide the fact of nuisance. This
provision the courts have been daily enforcing against various noxious subjects; and if breweries and casks of liquor are nuisances,
why have they not been prosecuted and abated also? What was
the need of this special law upon the subject? We have assumed
thus far, upon this branch of the case, that the Constitution
protects private property and pursuits, and the use of private
property by way of beverage as well as medicine. It may be
necessary, at this day, to demonstrate the fact.
The first section of the first article declares, "that all men are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Under
our Constitution, then, we all have some natural rights that have
not been surrendered, and which government cannot deprive us of,
unless we shall first forfeit them by our crimes; and to secure to
the enjoyment of these rights, is the great end and aim of the
Constitution itself.
It thus appears conceded, that rights existed anterior to the
Constitution-that we did not derive them from it, but established
itto secure to us the enjoyment of them; and it here becomes
important to ascertain, with some degree of precision, what these
rights, natural rights, are.
Chancellor Kent, following Blackstone, says, vol. ii. p. 1: "The
absolute [or natural] rights of individuals may be resolved into the
right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the
right to acquire and enjoy property ;" not some property, or one
kind of property, but, at least, whatsoever the society organizing
government recognizes as property. How much does this right
embrace-how far does it extend? It undoubtedly extends to the
right of pursuing the trades of manufacturing, buying and selling,
and to the practice of using. These acts are but means of acquiring
and enjoying, and are absolutely necessary and incidental to them.
What, we may ask, is the right of property worth, stripped of the
right of producing and using? "The right of property is equally
invaded by obstructing the free employment of the means of pro-
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duction, as by violently depriving the proprietor of the product of
his land." Say's Pol. Economy, 133.
In Arrowsmith vs. Burlinger, 4 McLean, 497, it is said, "A
freeman may buy and sell at his pleasure. This right is not of
society, but from nature. He never gave it up. It would be
amusing to see a man hunting through our law books for authority
to buy or sell or make a bargain." To the same effect Lord Coke,
in 2 Inst. c. 29, p. 47; Rutherford's Institutes, p. 20. This great
natural right of using our liberty in pursuing trade and business
for the acquisition of property, and of pursuing our happiness in
using it, though not secure in Europe from the invasions of omnipotent parliaments or executives, is secured to us by our Constitution.
For, in addition to the first section which we have quoted, and
aside from the fact that the very purpose of establishing the
Constitution was such security, by Sect. 11, Art. 1, it is declared
that we shall be secure in our "persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable search and seizure." By section 21, we have
the right to devote our labor to our own advantage, and to keep
our property or its value for our own use, as they cannot be taken
from us without being paid for. And by section 12 it is declared,
that "every man, for injury done to him in his person, property,
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." These
sections, fairly construed, will protect the citizen in the use of his
industrial faculties, and in the enjoyment of his acquisitions. This
doctrine is not new in this court. In -Doe vs. Douglass, 8 Blackf.
10, in speaking of the limitations in our Constitution upon the
legislative power, it is said, "they restrain the legislature from
passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract, from the
performance of a judicial act, and from any flagrant violation of
the right of private property." This latter restriction, we think, is
clearly contained in the 1st and 24th sections of the first article of
our Constitution of 1816.
We lay down this proposition, then, as applicable to the present
ease: that the right of liberty and pursuing happiness secured by
the Constitution, embraces the right, in each compos mentis individual, of selecting what he will eat and drink-in short, his
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beverages, so far as he may be capable of producing them, or they
may be within his reach, and that the legislature cannot take
away that right by direct enactment. If the Constitution does not
secure this right to the people, it secures nothing of value. If the
people are subject to be controlled by the legislature in the matter
of their beverages, so they are as to their articles of dress, and in
their hours of sleeping and waking. And if the people are-incompetent to select their own beverages, they are also incompetent to
determine anything in relation to their living, and should be placed
at once in a state of pupilage to a set of government sumptuary
officers; eulogies upon the dignity of human nature should cease,
and the doctrine of the competency of the people for self-government be declared a deluding rhetorical flourish. If the government
can prohibit any practice it pleases, it can prohibit the drinking of
cold water. Can it do that? If not, why not? If we are right
in this, that the Constitution restrains ,the legislature from passing
a law regulating the diet of the people, a sumptuary law, for that
under consideration is such, no matter whether its object be morals
or economy, or both, then the legislature cannot prohibit the manufacture and sale for use as a beverage, of ale, porter, beer, &c., and
cannot declare those manufactured, kept and sold for that purpose
a nuisance, if such is the use to which those articles are put by the
people. It all resolves itself into this, as in the case of printing,
worshipping God, &c. If thd Constitution does not protect the
people in the right, the legislature may probably prohibit; if it
does, the legislature cannot. We think the Constitution furnishes
the protection. If it does not in this particular, it does, as we
have said, as to nothing of any importance; and tea, coffee,
tobacco, corn bread, ham and eggs, may next be placed under the
ban. The very extent to which a concession of the power in this
case -would carry its exercise, shows it cannot exist. We are confirmed in this view when we consider, that at the adoption of our
present Constitution, there were in the State fifty distilleries and
breweries, in which half a million of dollars was invested; five
hundred men were employed; which furnished a market annually
for two millions bushels of grain, and turned out manufactured
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products to the value of a million of dollars, which were consumed
by our people, to a great extent, as a beverage. With these facts
existing, the question of incorporating into the Constitution the
prohibitory principle, was repeatedly brought before the constitutional convention, and uniformly rejected. Debates in the Convention, vol. ii. p. 1434, and others. We are further strengthened in
this opinion when we notice, as we will as matter of general knowledge, the universality of the use of these articles as a beverage.
It shows the judgment of mankind as to their value. "This use
may be traced in several parts of the ancient world. Pliny, the
naturalist, states that in his time it was in general use amongst all
the several nations who inhabited the western part of Europe; and,
according to him, it was not confined to those northern countries
whose climate did not permit the successful cultivation of the grape.
He mentions that the inhabitants of Egypt and Spain used a kind
of ale; and says that, though it was differently named in different
countries, it was universally the same liquor. See Plin. Nat. Hist.,
lib. 14, c. 22. Herodotus, who wrote five hundred years before
Pliny, tells us that Egyptians used a liquor made of barley. (2, 77.)
Dion Cassius alludes to a similar beverage among the people inhabiting the shores of the Adriatic. Lib. 49, De Pannonis.
Tacitus states that the ancient Germans, for their drink, used a
liquor from barley or other grain, and fermented it so as to make
it resemble wine. Tacitus De Mor. Germ., c. 23. Ale was also the
favorite liquor of the Anglo-Saxons and Danes. If the accountsgiven by Isodorus and Orosinus, of the method of making ale
amongst the ancient Britons be correct, it is evident that it did not
essentially differ from our modern brewing. They state "that the
grain is steeped in water and made to germinate; it is then dried
and ground; after which it is infused in a certain quantity of water,
which is afterwards fermented."
(Henry's History of England, vol. ii. p. 864.) "In early periods
of the history of England, ale and bread appear to have been
considered equally victuals, or absolute necessaries of life."
In biblical history, we are told that the "vine, a plant which
bears clusters of grapes, out of which wine is pressed," "so

HERMAN vs. THE STATE.

abounded in Palestine, that almost every family had a vineyard."
Solomon, said to be the wisest man, bad extensive vineyards, which
he leased to tenants. Song 8, verse 12; and David, in his 104th
.Psalm, in speaking of the greatness, power and works of God,
iays, verses 14 and 15: "He causeth grass to grow for the cattle,
and herb for the service of man; and wine that maketh glad the
heart of man, and oil to make his face shine, and bread which
strengtheneth man's heart."
It thus appears, if the inspired psalmist is entitled to credit, that
man was made to laugh as well as weep, and that these stimulating
beverages were created by the Almighty expressly to promote his
social hilarity and enjoyment. And for this purpose have the
world ever used them; they have ever given, in the language of
another passage of Scripture, strong drink to him that was weary,
and wine to those of heavy heart. The first miracle wrought by
our Saviour, that at Cana of Galilee, the place where he dwelt in
his youth, and where he met his followers after his resurrection,
was to supply this article, to increase the festivities of a joyous
occasion; that he used it himself is evident from the fact, that he
was called by his enemies a wine-bibber; and he paid it the distinguished honor of being the eternal memorial of his death and man's
redemption.
From De Bow's Compendium of the Census of 1850, p, 182, we
learn, that at that date there were in the United States 1217 distilleries and breweries, with a capital of $8,507,574, consuming some
18,000,000 bushels of grain and apples, 1294 tons of hops and
61,675 hogsheads of molasses, and producing some 83,000,000
gallons of liquor,
From the Secretary of the Treasury's report of the commerce
and navigation of the United States for 1850, we gather that there
were imported into the United States, in that year, about 15,000,000
gallons of various kinds of liquors.
By the National Cyclopmdia, vol. xii. p. 984, we are informed
that for the year ending January 5, 1850, there were imported into
Great Britain and Ireland, 7,970,067 gallons of wine, 4,950,781
of brandy, and 5,123,148 of rum; and that there were manufac-
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tured in the same period, in that kingdom, in round numbers,
25,000,000 gallons.
In the Oth vol. of the same work, p. 328, it is said: "The vine
is one of the most important objects of cultivation in France. Theamount of land occupied by this culture is about 5,000,000 English
acres. The average yearly product is about 926,000,000 English
gallons, of which about one-sixth is converted into brandy. The
annual produce of the vineyards is estimated at about X28,500,000
sterling, [near 140,000,000 dollars.] of which ten-eleventbs is consumed in France." Wine is tbe common beverage of the people of
France; and yet Professor Silliman, of Yale College, on the 17th
of April, 1851, then at Chalous, writes, vol. i. p. 185, of his visit
to Europe:
"In traveling more than 400 miles through the rural districts of
France, we have seen only a quiet, industrious population, peaceable in their habits, and, as far as we had intercourse with them,
courteous and kind in their manners. We have seen no rudeness,
no broil or tumult-have observed no one who was not decently
clad, or who appeared to be ill fed. We are told, however, that
the French peasantry live upon very small supplies of food, and in
their houses are satisfied with very humble accommodations. Except in Paris, we have seen no instance of apparent suffering, and
few even there; nor have we seen a single individual intoxicated, or
without shoes and stockings."
We have thus shown, from what we will take notice of historically,
that the use of liquors, as a beverage, and article of trade and commerce, is so universal that they cannot be pronounced a nuisance.
The world does not so regard them, and will not till the Bible is
discarded and an overwhelming change in public sentiment, if not in
man's nature, wrought. And who, as we have asked before, is to
force the people to discontinue the use of beverages ?
Counsel say, the maxim that you shall so use your own as not to
injure another, justifies such a law by the legislature, but the maxim
is misapplied; for it contemplates the free use by the owner, of
his property, but with such care as not to trespass upon his neighbor; while this prohibitory law forbids the owner to use his own in
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any manner as a beverage. It is based on theprinciple that aman
shall not use at all for enjoyment what his neighbor may abuse, a
doctrine that would, if enforced by law in general practice, annihilate society, make eunuchs of all men, or drive them into the cells
of the monks, and bring the human race to an end, or continue it
under the direction of licensed county agents.
Such, however, is not the principle upon which the Almighty
governs the world. He made man a free agent, and to -give him
opportunity to exercise his will, to be virtuous or vicious as he
should choose, he placed evil as-well as good before him, he put the
apple into the garden of Eden, and left upon man the responsibility
of his choice,-made it a moral question, and left it so. He enacted
as to that, a moral, not a physical prohibition. He could have easily
enacted a physical prohibitory law by declaring the fatal apple a
nuisance, and removing it. He did not. His purpose was otherwise, and he has since declared that the tares and wheat shall grow
together to the end of the world. Man cannot by prohibitory laws
be robbed of his free agency. See Milton's Areopagitica or speech
for Liberty of unlicensed printing, Works, vol. 1, p. 166.
But notwithstanding the legislature cannot prohibit, it can, by
enactments within constitutional limits, so regulate the use. of
intoxicating beverages, as to prevent most of the abuses to which
the use may be subject. We do not say that it can all; for
under our system of government, founded in a confidence in man's
capacity to direct his own conduct, designed to allow to ehch individual the largest liberty consistent with the welfare of the whole,
and to subject the private affairs of the citizen to the-least possible
governmental interference, some excesses will occur, and must be
tolerated, subject only to such punishment as may be inflicted.
This itself will be preventive in its influence. The happiness enjoyed in the exercise of general, reasonably regulated liberty, by all,
overbalances the evil of occasional individual excess. " Order"
must not be made to "reign" here as once "1at Warsaw," by the
annihilation of all freedom of action, crushing out, indeed, the spirit itself of liberty. With us, in the language of the then illustrious
Burke, when defending the revolting American colonies, something
must be pardoned to the spirit of liberty.
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What regulations of the liquor business would be constitutional,
it is not for us to indicate in advance ; but those which the legisla-

ture may from time to time prescribe can be brought by the citizen
to the constitutional test before the judiciary, and it will devolve
upon that department to decide upon their consistency with the
organic law; in fact, the question of power, of usurpation, between
the people and the people's representatives; and in doing this, so far
as it may devolve upon us, we shall cheerfully throw every doubt
in favor of the latter, and of stringent regulations. Such is the
constitution of our government. Maize vs. The State, 4 Ind. 842;
Thomas vs. Tie Board of Commissioners of £?ay County, 5 Ind.
557; Greencastle Township vs. Black, 5 Ind. 557; Larmer vs.
The Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill, 121; Dunham vs. The Trustees of
.ochester, 5 Cowen, 462; Colter vs. Doty, 5 Ohio, 393.
It is like the case of laws for the collection of debts. The constitution prohibits the passage of an act impairing the obligation of
a contract; yet the legislature may regulate the remedy upon contracts, but must regulate within such limits as not substantially to
impair the remedy, as that would indirectly impair the obligation of
the contract itself. Gantly's Lessee vs. -Ewing, 3 How. U. S. R. 707.
Regulations within constitutional limits, we have no doubt, if
efficiently enforced, will accomplish, as we have said, nearly all that
can reasonably be desired.
The legislature, we will add, may undoubtedly require the forfeiture of such particular portions of liquor as shall be kept for use
in violation of proper regulations, as in the case of gunpowder
stored in a populous city, and this forfeiture will be adjudged by
the judiciary; see Colter vs. Doty, supra, but neither all the gunpowder nor liquor in the State, accompanied by the prohibition of
the further manufacture and use of the article, can be forfeited on
account of the improper use of a given quantity, because the entirety of neither of the articles is a nuisance. It is not pretended
to be so as to gunpowder, and we think we have shown it is not so
as to liquor. So, it is doubtless competent for the legislature to
establish proper police regulations to prevent the introducing of
foreign paupers, &c., for there is a palpable difference between ex-
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cluding a foreign, and expelling a citizen pauper. The constitutional convention thought it might have power to prohibit the ingress
of foreign, while it might not to compel the egress of resident
negroes.
So, by such regulations, may the introduction of nuisances be prevented; for there is a wide difference between assuming to declare
that a given thing is a nuisance, and the prohibiting of the introduction of what is conceded, or shall turn out to be, a nuisance.
And, in fact the restrictions in the constitution upon the legislative power may operate for the benefit of those -living under, and
in some sense a party to, its provisions, and not for that of strangers.
It will not be denied that but for the constitution and laws of the
United States which impose the restriction, the State, as an independent sovereignty, might exclude from her borders all foreign
liquors, whether nuisances or not, unless, indeed, the doctrine upon
which Great Britain was defended in forcing trade with China at
the cannon's mouth~be correct, that in this day of Christian civilization, it is the duty of all nations to admit universal reciprocal trade
and commerce, a doctrine, not yet we think, incorporated into the
code of international law.
And it would not follow that, because the State might prohibit
the introduction of foreign wheat, she could, therefore, -prohibit the
cultivation of it within the State by her own citizens. The right of
the State to prevent the introduction of foreign objects does not
depend upon the fact of their being nuisances, or offensive otherwise; but she does it, when not restrained by the constitution or
laws of the United States, in the exercise of her sovereign will.
This, however, is a topic involving questions of power between
the State and Federal Governments, which we do not intend discussing in the present opinion. We limit ourselves here to the
question of the power of the legislature over the property and pursuits of the citizen under the State constitution. The restrictions
which we have examined upon the legislative power of the State
were inserted in the constitution to protect the minority from the
oppression of the majority, and all from the usurpation of the legislature, the members of which, under our plurality system of elec-
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tions, may be returned by a minority of the people. They should,
therefore, be faithfully maintained. They are the main safe-guards
to the persons and property of the State.
It is easy to see that when the peeple are smarting under losses
from depreciated bank paper, a feeling might be aroused that would
under our plurality system, return a majority to the legislature,
which would declare all banks a nuisance, confiscate their paper and
the buildings from which it issues.
So with railroads, when repeated wholesale murders are perpetrated by some of them. And, in Great Britain and France, we
have examples of the confiscation of the property of the churches
even ; which, here, the same constitution that protects the dealer in
'beer, would render safe from invasion by the legislative power.
In our opinion for the reasons given above, the liquor act of 1855
is void., Let the prisoner be discharged.

Supreme Court of Louisiana,1855.
GAINES' APPEAL, in re SUCCESSION OF DANIEL CLARK.'
1. The provision of the Code of Louisiana, which requires for the proof of an olographic will, the 1, testimony of two credible witnesses, who declare that they
recognize the testament as entirely written, dated and signed, in the testator's
handwriting, as having often seen him write and sign during his lifetime," (Art.
1648,) is directory merely, and does not, where such proof is wanting by reason
of accident, as in the case of a lost or destroyed will, exclude secondary evidence
of the will. LEA, J., dissenting.
2. Contents of an alleged lost or destroyed olographic will, admitted to probate
after the expiration of forty years, the delay being explained, upon evidence
establishing the former existence and principal contents of such a will, and the
probability of its due execution in accordance with the Code; though it did not
affirmatively appear that the witnesses had ever seen the testator write or sign
his name, in his lifetime. LEA, J., dissenting.
I Buchanan, J. took no part in the decision of this case.
Other branches of this same controversy, have been at different times before the
Supreme Court of the United States. See, 13 Peters' Reports, 404; 15 Idem. 9;
2 Howard's Reports, 619; 6 Idem, 550; 12 Idem, 472; in which last decision the
illegitimacy of the present appellant was held to be established.
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This was an appeal from the decision of the Second District
Court of New Orleans, refusing probate of the contents of an
alleged olographic will of the late Daniel Clark.
The petition of the proponent, filed January 18th, 1855, was in
the following words:
To the Hon. the Second District Court of New Orleans:
The petition of Myra Clark Gaines, who resides in the City and
State of New York, respectfully represents that, on the sixteenth
day of August, A. D. 1813, Daniel Clark, then residing in New
Orleans, departed this life, leaving no descendants except your
petitioner, who is the daughter of the said deceased; that on the
thirteenth day of July, 1818, the said Daniel Clark made his last
will, which was in substance and to the effect following:
"New Orleans, July lath, 1813. In the name of God-Amen.
I, Daniel Clark, of New Orleans, do make this my last will and
testament. Imprimis: I order that all my just debts be paid.
Second. I do hereby acknowledge that my beloved Myra, who
is now living in the family of Samuel B. Davis, is my legitimate
and only daughter; and that I leave and bequeath unto her, the
said Myra, all the estate, whether real or personal, of which I may
die possessed, subject only to the payment of certain legacies hereinafter named.
Third. It is my desire that my friend, Chevalier Frangois Dusuan
Delacroix, shall have the charge of my said daughter Myra, and I
do appoint and constitute him tutor to her.
Fourth. I give and bequeath to my mother, Mary Clark, now
or recently of Germantown, in the State of Pennsylvania, an annuity
of two thousand dollars, which is to be paid out of my estate, during
her life. I further give and bequeath an annuity of five hundred
dollars to Caroline Degrange, until she arrives at the age of majority, after which I give and bequeath her a legacy of five thousand
dollars.
Fifth. I hereby nominate and appoint my friends, Frangois
Dusuan Delacroix, James Pitot, and Joseph D. D. Bellechasse, my
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executors, with full power to execute this my last will, and to settle
everything relating to my estate."
Petitioner further avers, that the said will contained other legacies and dispositions-that said testator gave a legacy of $5,000 to
a son of the said Pitot, and another of $5,000 to a son of Mr.
DeBuys, both of New Orleans; he also provided for the freedom
and maintenance of his slave Lubin. In his said will, the said Clark
made an inventory of his estate, with explanations of his business
relations, and gave instructions to the said tutor Delacroix, in regard
to the education of your petitioner. She further represents that
the said will was an olographic one, wholly written, dated and signed
by the testator in his proper handwriting, and at the death of the
said Clark, was left among his papers at his residence. That after
his decease, diligent search was made for the said will, but the same
could not be found, nor has it been since, and it was either mislaid,
lost, or destroyed. That the destruction of the said will has prevented her from giving the contents thereof, with any greater
certainty than as set forth herein above. Petitioner further shows,
that Messrs. Bellechasse and Pitot, two of the above named executors, are dead; that the said Delacroix-the other, is indisposed to
accept the executorship of the said will-and that no presumptive
heirs of the said Clark reside in this State. She further shows,
that at the decease of the said Clark, and for many years after, she
was a minor, wholly ignorant of her rights under the said will, and
that after she aiived at the age of majority, and was made acquainted with the matters aforesaid, she instituted suit the 18th of
June, 1834, in the Probate Court of New Orleans, for the purpose
of proving the said will; but that said suit was dismissed, as in case
of nonsuit, on the 8th day of June, 1836, without any fault of your
petitioner. That in the year 1836, she instituted suit by Bill in
Chancery, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, to set up the said will, and enforce her rights
as universal legatee under the same, but that the Supreme Court of
the United States dismissed her claim under the said will, as in case
of nonsuit, without deciding on the merits of the cause, and without
the fault of your petitioner.
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Wherefore, she prays that this honorable court would fix a day,
place and hour, for the proof of the said will; and after all due
proceedings, such as the law requires, that the same may be recorded
and its execution ordered, and for general relief; and she will ever
pray, &c.
(Signed,)

SMILEY & PERIN,
P. E. BONFORD,
MOISE & WM. RANDOLPH,
Attorneys for .Petitioner.

Upon this petition an order was made allowing proof of the will
referred to, to be made at a day fixed. On the evidence then
adduced, however, the court below was of opinion that the will had
not been duly established according to the requirements of the Code;
whereupon this appeal was taken.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the majority of
the Supreme Court, which was delivered by
MERRIcK, Ch. J.-In this case we adopt the carefully prepared
statement of facts of the judge of the lower court; it is in these
words, viz:
"The petitioner alleges that on the 16th day of August, 1818,
the late Daniel Clark, her father, departed this life, having previously, viz: on the 18th day of July, 1813, executed an olographic
last will and testament, by which he recognized her as his legitimate
and only daughter, and constituted her his universal legatee, said
bequest being subject, however, to the payment of certain specific
legacies; that he appointed Franuois Dusuan Delacroix, James
Pitot, and Jos. Bellechasse, the executors of said will; that said
will was wholly written, dated, and signed in the handwriting of
the testator, and at his death left among his papers at his residence;
that after his death, diligent search was made for the said will, but
that the same could not be found, nor has it been since, and that it
was either mislaid, lost or destroyed. It is unnecessary to recapitulate more in detail the alleged contents of the will, or to advert to
the history of events as set forth in the petition, under which, the
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court is called upon to recognize this lost document as a valid
testament, after an interval of more than forty years, since the
death of the alleged testator. The litigation, of which the present
proceedings appears to be an upspringing shoot, is incorporated in
the jurisprudence of the country, and a reference to it will not
materially assist in the solution of the question submitted for adjudication. The petitioner asks that the will, such as she describes
it, be admitted to probate, registered and ordered to be executed.
"To entitle the petitioner to ajudgment, recognizing the existence
and validity of the will, it is necessary that she should establish
affirmatively, and by such testimony as the law deems requisite:
"First, That Daniel Clark did execute a last will containing the
testamentary dispositions set forth in her petition.
"Second, That Clark died without having destroyed or revoked it.
"In looking for the testimony which might solve the question,
whether such a will had ever been executed or not, a reasonable
inquirer would naturally turn for information to those who were
most with the deceased in the latter part of his life, and especially
(if they could be found) to those who were with him in the last
moments of his existence, when the hand of death was on him.
Such witnesses, if they had no interest in diverting his property
into any particular channels, might be considered as the best and
most reliable that could be produced, and it appears to be precisely
testimony of this character that the petitioner presents in support
of her application. It appears that Boisfontaine had business
relations with the deceased which brought him into frequent intercourse with him, and that for the last two days of his life, and up
to the moment of his death, he was with him; that Delacroix and
Bellechasse were intimate personal friends, and that they were with
him shortly before his death.
"Now these witnesses all concur in stating that Clark Said he
had executed a will posterior to that of 1811. They also testify
that within a few months prior to his death, he was making arrangements for the disposal of his property by a last will. He called on
Delacroix to get his consent to act as executor, and also to act as
tutor to his daughter Myra, expressing his intention of making
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generous provision for her in his will. Delacroix further states
that Clark afterwards presented to him in his (Clark's) ' cabinet' a
sealed packet, which he declared to be his last will, informing him,
at the same time, that in case of his death, it would be found in a
small black trunk which he had there. Boisfontaine, who was with
Clark when he died, says that Clark, in his last illness, spoke of
executing his last will; said it was to be found in a small black trunk
in a room below stairs; that he had left the greater portion of his
property to his child Myra; that Bellechasse, Delacroix and Pitot
were to be his executors, and that about two hours before he died,
he instructed his confidential servant, Lubin, that in case of his
death, the small black trunk above referred to was to be delivered
to Delacroix, and enjoined upon him as soon as he (Clark) was dead,
to be sure to take it to him. He says that Clark expressed his
satisfaction that he had provided for his daughter Myra, leaving her
all his estate, and that Delacroix had consented to act as her tutor.
He also states that he was present about fifteen days before Clark's
death, when Clark took from the small black case a sealed package
and presented it to Delacroix, stating that it was his last will,
recapitulating some of its provisions, and reminding him of his
promise to act as tutor to his daughter. He further states that
several persons, shortly before Clark's death, had seen the will and
corroborated Clark's statement as to its contents, and that Judge
Pitot, Lynd the Notary, the wife of Win. Harper, and Bellechasse,
were among the persons referred to." Now the judge a quo proceeds: "I think there can be no doubt, setting aside the testimony
of Bellechasse and Mrs. Win. Harper, that Clark did execute a will
shortly before his death; that the principal object of making this
will was to recognize as his daughter the present applicant, and
to make suitable provision for her; that the executors of his will
were Pitot, Bellechasse and Delacroix, and that Delacroix was
appointed tutor to his daughter Myra; that this will must have been
in existence until within a very short time previous to Clark's death,
if not after that event, and that Clark himself died believing it was
in existence.
"That such was the opinion of Delacroix himself at the time is
24
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evident from the fact that twenty-four hours had scarcely elapsed
after the probate of the will of 1811, before he made oath, that be
verily believed, that Daniel Clark had made a 'testament posterior
to that of 1811,' 'that its existence was knowW to several persons,'
and he accordingly applied for and obtained an order of the court,
commanding every notary in the city to declare whether such
document had been deposited with him.
"If the foregoing facts may be considered as proved, independent
of the testimony of Bellechasse and Mrs. Win. Harper, the additional
testimony of these last named witnesses with reference to the form
of the execution of the will and its contents, will rest upon a basis
of probability which must strengthen, if it does not ahticipate the
conviction of its truth; for it is to be remembered that Clark knew
how to draw an olographic will in due form, having already done so
in the execution of the previous will, and knowing what was necessary to its validity, it would b" improbable in the extreme that he
would omit any of the few necessary formalities.
"When Bellechasse and Mrs. Harper therefore testified directly
to the execution of the will as having been written, dated, and signed
in the proper handwriting of the testator, they testify to the existence of facts which are at least probable, and upon the assumption
that the will was executed are matters approaching to certainty,
independent of their testimony; so with regard to the appointment
of executors, of the tutor and of the general dispositions of the will
as described in the petition.
"They state Clark did what he told others he intended to do,
and what, from the whole tenor of his conduct, it was very probable
he would do.
"It does not appear, however, that all the contents of the will,
as sworn to by Mrs. Win. Harper, are also sworn to by Bellechasse,
and though the testimony of the latter does not contradict that of
the former, but affirms it, yet his testimony does not relate to any
portions of the will except such as relate to its form, the institution
of his daughter as universal legatee, and the appointment of Delacroix, Pitot and Bellechasse as executors; indeed, the examination
of witnesses does not appear to have been conducted with any
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reference to a detailed description of the will. They, however, both
state distinctly that they read the will; that it was wholly written,
dated and signed by Clark; that he thereby instituted Myra Clark,
his daughter, universal legatee, and appointed Delacroix, Pitot and
Bellechasse his executors." From an examination of the whole
testimony, and considering the conduct of the deceased, his repeated
declarations up to the very day of his death, together with his
anxiety to make ample provision for his daughter, the judge of the
lower court added, "I feel satisfied that the legal presumption
(which, in the case of a lost will, would necessarily exist,) that it
was destroyed or revoked by the testator, must be considered as
satisfactorily rebutted."
In addition to the statement of facts and conclusions in regard to
them by the judge of the lower court, it may be remarked that
Delacroix states that the endorsement upon the will which he saw
sealed up was in these words: "Pour etre ouvert en cas de mort."
This endorsement does not appear upon the will of 1811, and the
will which he saw was doubtless the will of 1813. In regard to the
testimony of Colonel Bellechasse and Mrs. William Harper, there
is nothing on this record which impeaches their credibility.
If it be objected that the amount of property left by Clark may
have induced them to swerve from the truth, the reply has equal
force, that there would be just as strong a reason for any other
party in.interest to have prevented the execution of the will, by its
destruction. It may be remarked further, that the universal legacy
being established beyond question, the particular legacies which
tend to diminish the estate which will come into the hands of the
universal legatee, are sufficiently proved, on general principles,
against such legatee, by the testimony of a single witness, because
these legacies are alleged and set up in the petition of the party
who is to be charged with them, and she cannot be permitted afterwards to .deny what she has alleged in her pleadings.
Agreeing fully as we do with the conclusions arrived at by the
district judge, as to what has been proven, the only remaining
question for us to solve is one of law, and it is, has this will been
proven in conformity to Article No. 159, page 244 of the Old Code,
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or Article 1648 of the New Code, which requires for the proof of
the olographic will, the testimony of two credible witnesses, who
declare that they recognize the testament as being entirely written,
dated and signed in the testator's handwriting, as having often seen
him write and sign during his lifetime ?
The witnesses have sworn that the will was entirely dated and
signed by Daniel Clark, but they nowhere say that they have often
seen him write. They show an intimacy and relationship which
leave little room to doubt that they really were well acquainted
with his handwriting, and had probably seen him write often, as
required by the Code, but they have not expressly said so.
The question can, therefore, be answered only by determining
whether the provisions of law contained in this article of the Code
are sacramental, and must be pursued in all cases, or whether they
are merely directory, and the courts have power, in certain cases
where this proof is wanting, by reason of accident, to avail thempelves of the secondary proof-the next best of which the nature of
'the case will admit.
It would seem that there is a distinction between rules of law
which prescribe the form in which wills and testaments are to be
made, and those which direct the courts in what manner they shall
be admitted to probate, and ordered to be executed. The first
commencing at Article 1567 of the Civil Code are positive enactments, which are essential to the validity of the will. Their nonobservance renders the supposed will null and void, by express provision of law. 0. 0., 1588. The rules, on the other hand, which
are prescribed by the legislature for the opening and proof of testaments, commencing at article No. 1689, do not pronounce the
penalty of nullity for their non-observance, and they nowhere say
that other cases may not arise in which the strict letter of these
rules may be inapplicable, and that the judge may not, in extraordinary cases, receive other equally satisfactory proof that the
requirements of the law have been fulfilled.
In a nuncupative will by public act, it is required that certain
formalities should be observed, before a notary public and three
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witnesses.

Without these observances the will would not exist

as such.
The olographic will must be entirely written, dated and signed
by the testator. Without the observance of these requisites, there
is no legal will; and so of the other forms. But whenever these
forms have been observed, there is then a valid will entirely independent of its probate, or any subsequent proceeding which may
be commenced upon the same. But the law says that this valid
will shall remain inoperative until it receive the order for its execution by the judge of the probate court. But it has never been pretended that the validity of this will is, in any manner, affected by
the character of the proof, which the judge of the lower court may
deem sufficient, on which to base his order. If the will is really
valid, the irregular proof on which he may base his decree, cannot
render it invalid. The will subsists, and therefore the judgment
might be corrected on appeal; yet, if it were suffered to remain,
the courts would never permit a party to lose his right by a mere
irregularity in the proof upon which the decree was founded.
-Faulknervs. Field, 1 Rob. La. 48. So in the case before lis; the
will of 1811 was admitted to probate by Judge Pitot, upon the
single declaration of the witnesses, "that the same was in the proper handwriting of him, the said Daniel Clark." No one will pretend ihat this will was rendered invalid, because those witnesses did
not swear that they had often seen Daniel Clark write. Had the will
afterwards been attacked, on the ground that the will was not in the
handwriting of Daniel Clark, it would doubtless have been sustained, on satisfactory proof, that it was entirely written, dated and
signed in the handwriting of the testator.
The istinetion which we here draw between the positive enactments of law, in regard to the form for the execution of wills, and
the directory provisions in regard to the proof of the same, seems
to have been fully recognized by our predecessors. In the case of
Bouthemy vs. Dreux et als., 12 Mart. R., page 639, the court maintained a nuncupative will by private act, which had been admitted
to probate on the testimony of a single witness, notwithstanding
Article No. 159, page 244 of the Old Code. The distinction was also
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taken in the case of The succession of Robert, Pelid executor, 2 Rob.
La. 433; also, in effect, in the case of The succession of Eubanks,
9 Ann. R. 147, whore a witness was admitted to testify who did not
possess the qualifications required by Article 1584, C. C. This distinction also pervades the jurisprudence of France on this subject.
]By Article No. 1007 of the Code Napoleon, it is made the duty of
the judge to make a proc s verbal of the presentation of the olographic will, the opening of it, the order in which he found it, and
the order of deposit with the notary. These provisions appear to
be considered directory only. Paillet, note 2 to Article 1007, Code
Napoleon, says:
"La pr6sentation du testament au pr6sident du tribunal, l'ouverture des testaments par magistrat, et le procs verbal qu'il doit
dresser ainsi que de l'6tat du testament, sont sans contredit des pr6cautions que Ia loi a cru n6cessaires, pour qu'on pe-tt Atre assur6 de
plus enplus de la volont6 des testateurs ;mais la loi n'a point attach6
a l'inobservation de ces formalit~s de la peine de nullitd, et on ne
saurait ]a prononcer, surtout lorsque rien n'indique de fraude de la
part de l'hdritier institu6 ou du 16gataire." See note and authorities there cited.
Taking it, therefore, as granted that the distinction which we
have indicated exists, the next question which presents itself is, do
the circumstances of this case take it out of the rule prescribed by
Article No. 1648 of the Civil Code? We think the loss or destruction of the will after the death of Clark, and the long period of time
which has elapsed since his death, justify a resort to secondary evidence, which would not have been necessary, if the will had not been
lost or destroyed, and if so long a period had not elapsed before an
attempt had been made to admit it to probate. We think this view
of the law is fully sustained, both by reason and authority.
Article 1648 contemplates that the olographic. will shall be presented before the judge before whom it is to be proven. Yet none
would seriously contend that the calamity which deprived the legatee
of the will, would prevent him from establishing its contents by
secondary evidence. Were this the law, a reward would be offered
to villany, and it would always be in the power of the unscrupulous
heir to prevent the execution of the will. The case of Thomas et
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al. vs. Thomas, 2 L. R. 166, was a controversy in regard to a lost
will, which it had been alleged had already been admitted to probate. The objection to the proof was: "That parol proof of the
execution of the will could not be given in that court; that a will,
being an instrument clothed with certain formalities prescribed by
law in order to give it effect, no evidence of its loss or its contents
could be offered until its existence, -with the requisite formalities,
had been proved."
Judge Porter, as the organ of the court on this point, remarks
with his usual felicity: "The first objection is entitled to more consideration, but we still believe it unsound. The law of evidence
would have a poor claim to the praise justly bestowed on it, if it did
not foresee and provide for such a case as this. That rule which is
the most universal, namely, that the best evidence the nature of the
case will admit, shall be produced, decides the objection; for it is
only another form of expression for the idea, that when you lose
the higher proof you may offer the next best in your power. The
case admits of no better evidence than that which you possess, ifthe
superiorproof has been lost without your fault.
" The rule does not mean that men's rights are to be sacrificed
and their property lost, because they cannot guard against events
beyond their control. It only means, that so long as the higher or
superior evidence is within your possession, or may be reached by
you, you shall give no inferior proof in relation to it. Particular
rules which require written proof always relax themselves to meet
absolute necessity, or that necessity which is occasioned by occurrences common among men.
"There is nothing in a will being required to be made in a particular form, which makes it an exception to this great law of
necessity. It may increase the difficulty of proof, but furnishes no
reason to refuse hearing it. The court, in this case, had proof
before them which much diminished the danger of parol evidence.
"In the case of The succession of Maria J. Robert, Peli4 executor, 2 Rob. Rep. 484, which was a contest growing out of an olographic will executed in France, and therq deposited, the proof was
by witnesses who were acquainted with the handwriting of the tes-
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tatrix. It does not appear that they had often seen her write.
The court, after holding this sufficient, as being all which was
required by the law of France, says: "It has been insisted, however, that Articles 1648 and 1649 of our Code show that the original will ought to be produced, in order to be identified with the
testimony of the witnesses who have recognized it; and that, in its
absence, the evidence would be incomplete. This position would
perhaps be correct, if the witnesses were in personal attendance
before the court of probate; but these articles are not negative
laws; they do not say that no other kind of proof shall be admitted,
and we doubt very much whether, under their application, if an
olographic testament executed here, had by some accident been
destroyed before being legally proved, a true copy of it, identified
with the original, by the testimony of two credible witnesses who
had seen both, and who would be able to swear to the genuineness of the original, in the manner pointed out by law, should not
be considered as sufficient compliance with the provisions of our
code.
"Surely we are not prepared to say that, in such a case, the
legal rights acquired under the will would also be defeated, and
that the party would be left without a remedy. This is, indeed,
an analogous and even stronger case, and as, in our opinion, the
law-makers cannot have intended to require- an impossibility, we
must conclude that, under such circumstances, the proof furnished
by the appellants is a sufficient compliance with the requisites of
the codes, and that the inferior judge did not err in ordering the
execution of the will under consideration."
In view of these decisions of our own courts, in regard to the
construction of Article No. 1648, it is not necessary to examine
the decisions of the court, on analogous articles of the Civil Code,
and the Code of Practice, in order to arrive at a conclusion on this.
The doctrine of the common law is in consonance with the view
taken by our own courts. The books are filled with adjudged cases,
in regard both to lost deeds and wills. We will content ourselves
by citing one-the case of -Dan vs. Brown, 4 Cowen, 483. The
suit was brought upon a lost will devising real estate. By the
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statute laws of New York, a will devising real estate was required
to be proved by three credible witnesses. The Supreme Court "of
New York say, in regard to this lost will: "The will of Benajah
Brown was proved by one of the subscribing witnesses. He stated
it was executed in the presence of himself, James Mallory, and
another person, whose name he did not recollect, but which he had
no doubt of his being a credible witness. This," the court adds,
"was all the evidence which could be expected under the circumstances of the case."
Considering that the administration of justice requires something
more than the application of the letter of the law designed for one
class of cases of ordinary occurrence, to all others, however they
may have been modified by accident, and believing that the spirit
of our laws provides for the case which the applicant has presented
to us, we conclude that the will of 1813, such as she has set forth
in her petition, should be admitted to probate.
It has been objected, as we understand the argument, that this
court has no jurisdiction of this case on appeal, under the Constitution, because there is no contestatio litis formed, and because
there are no proper parties to the appeal. We dismiss this objection with the single observation, that it is not necessary under the
Constitution, that there should be a technical contestatio litis, in
order to give this court jurisdiction ; and if the attorney of absent
heirs were even necessary as a party, his presence here is sufficient
to sustain this appeal.
We are not insensible to the argument that this claim has remained
for forty years without being set up in a court of justice, in a form
to be prosecuted to effect, and that rights have been recognized
under the sales made under the will of 1811. The staleness of
petitioner's suit is best answered by reference to the litigation in
which the petitioner's alleged rights have been prosecuted in other
forms ; and we may suppose it did not become necessary to resort
to the unusual proceeding of applying for the probate of a lost
will, until after those cases were decided. The plaintiff presents'to
us a primafacie case, which entitles her to relief.
The decision which we make does not exclude any one who may
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desire to contest the will with her in a direct action, and to show
that no such will was executed. On the other hand, a refusal
to probate the will places it beyond the power of the applicant to
set up her rights under the will, against any other person.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court, that
the judgment of the lower court be avoided and reversed; and, proceeding to render such judgment as should have been rendered in
the lower court: It is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the
will of Daniel Clark, dated New Orleans, July 13, 1813, as set
forth in plaintiff's petition, be recognized as his last will and testament, and the same is ordered to be received, recorded and executed as such; and it is further ordered that Frangois Dusuan De
la Croix be confirmed as testamentary executor of said last will and
testament, and that letters testamentary issue to the said De la
Croix, and that the costs of this proceeding be borne by the succession.
LEA, J., who -had been also judge of the court below, at the time

of the offer of the will in question for probate, dissented.

In the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of Delaware,
October, 1855.
UNION CHURCH OF AFRICANS VS. ELLIS SAUNDERS.

Under the voluntary system of church government, in this country (except, it would
seem, in cases of actual endowment), a mandamus cannot issue to compel the
trustees or members of a particular church to admit a minister to the exercise
of his spiritual functions, and this, though he may have been duly appointed
thereto by the superior ecclesiastical authority, - e. g. by a Methodist yearly
Conference,-especially if the right of consent is reserved by charter or agreement to such trustees or members.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Join\-s, Ch. -The
Superior Court, on the petition of Ellis
Saunders, having awarded the writ of mandamus, commanding the
Union Church to admit him to the exercise of the functions of his
office, the case has been brought before this court by writ of error.
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In the record certified and the assignment of errors, we have presented several questions for our consideration. It does not appear
necessary to notice all the objections, unless we should be of opinion
the Superior Court had jurisdiction. This question of jurisdiction,
as the most important, I shall therefore proceed to consider. The
writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. The petitioner states the injury to be .the refusal of the trustees of the
Union Church of Africans in Wilmington, to admit him to preach
in the said church whenever he may see proper so to do, and to administer the ordinances and discipline thereof, and to exercise a pastoral charge over the same, and asks the aid of the secular court by writ
of mandamus. The party thus seeking the interposition of the civil
power to enforce submission to the exercise of his official functions,
founds his right so to do, upon the discipline and usages of the
Methodist Church, and alleges that by virtue thereof, he being an
elder minister, it is his duty and right to preach in the said Union
Church in Wilmington, whenever he may see proper so to'do, and
to administer the ordinances and discipline thereof, and to exercise
a pastoral charge over the same. These functions are spiritual, and
emanate from and are conferred by ecclesiastical authority. It is
not stated that any endowment exists, or any temporal emolument.
Upon this ground there could be no color for sustaining the application. The English decisions recognize the right to the office of
rector, as involving a legal right, because the established church
being a constituent part of the constitution, has a legal foundation
and consequently a legal existence. Hence the rector is seised of
his church and glebes, and if dispossessed may have remedy by writ
of mandamus, which is a legal remedy for a legal right. Under
their toleration acts, by analogy the same jurisdiction has been exercised. As in the case of Rez vs. Barker, 3 Burr., 1268,
the church being endowed by deed. Justice Foster remarked
"here is a legal right. Their ministers are tolerated and allowed,
their right is established as a legal right and as much as any other
legal right." But in England if no legal title and no endowment,
the writ of mandamus will not be awarded, and has been refused.
Thus in Xing vs. Bishop of London, 1 Term R. 333, which re-
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sembles in some respects the present case, Lord Mansfield remarked,
there is no color for granting the writ, the office is not endowed,
it depends upon voluntary contribution.
In 4 Term R. 125, a
similar opinion is expressed by Lord Kenyon. Such has been the
judgment of eminent judges under a system of government uniting
Church and State. But in our country, and in our State, where
the constitution declares "that no power shall or ought to be vested
in or assumed by any magistrate, that shall in any] case interfere
with, or in any, manner control the rights of conscience in the free
exercise of religious worship," it would appear reasonable to conclude, that all ecclesiastical offices and functions are excluded
from the jurisdiction of the civil courts.
Regarding the ecclesiastical system as based upon the voluntary
principle, it therefore has neither legal capacity nor legal existence
and is incapable, sui juris, of acquiring or holding temporal property. Hence the necessity arises for acts of incorporation, or
trustees by deed, for the purpose of acquiring and holding property
through the instrumentality of lay corporations or laymen. But
the church in its ecclesiastical order, functions, and discipline remains intact, free from, and independent of the civil or secular
jurisdiction.
In accordance with the principle of the English decisions, we
find a case in 4 Harris & M lcHenry's Reports, page 448, which sustains the civil jurisdiction on the ground, that the church was endowed; but admitted that emoluments depending on voluntary contribution, would not be sufficient to warrant the court in issuing a
mandamus. The present case presents no such question for our
consideration, there being no endowment or permanent interest.
But it has been urged in support of the petitioner's right, that he
being an elder minister, qualified according to the discipline and
usage of the Methodist Church, is entitled to the use of the said
"Union Church," in Wilmington, by virtue of the second article of
the agreement which was executed and recorded at the time when
the religious society was formed and their trustees created a body
corporate in conformity with the provisions of the general act of
1787.
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The second article declares "the said corporation shall have,
hold, possess, and enjoy the temporal property in trust for the
religious uses of the ministers and preachers of the said Union
Church, for them and their African brethren, and their descendants
of the African race, duly licensed and ordained according to the
discipline adopted by the corporation." From this, it would seem,
that no such right could be derived from a license and ordination
conferred by a yearly conference, composed of persons not members
of the said corporation, but acting independent of it, and in conflict
with the articles of agreement, although such action may have been
in strict conformity with the ecclesiastical order, and discipline of
the 'Methodist Church.
It is apparent from the articles of agreement, that they were designed to establish an independent church, subject to the control of
the corporation, exclusive of all other influence over its temporal
affairs and property, except that of the members of the corporation. That this was the object contemplated by the written agreement, is manifest from the express provisions contained in the sixth
article, in the following words: "that no minister or teacher shall
be privileged to preach or exhort in the said Union Church, but
with the consent of the trustees and a majority :of the said corporation ;" and at the close of said article "that the by-laws and regulations which shall be made by the trustees from time to time, together with these articles of association, shall be deemed and taken
to be the true foundation of said church and the foundation on which
the said corporation shall exist."
If then, we allow the agreement of this religious society its legitimate effect, there can be no doubt, that without the consent of the
trustees, no minister can have a right to use the pulpit of the said
Union Church. The action of the annual conference, set forth in
the petition, cannot annul this provision, so clearly expressed in the
sixth article, and relied on in the return made to the alternative
mandamus.
Under this aspect of the case, it is only required of us to decide
whether the authority of the yearly conference is paramount, or the
written agreement of the members of the association; the law of the

